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INTRODUCTION
In December 1988, Gary Minnix, a mentally disordered
patient who lived in Western State Hospital, hid in a woman's
apartment in southwestern suburban Tacoma, Washington.'
Minnix was no common citizen; he had been suspected of
committing as many as twenty-two rapes and had been charged
with four violent rapes in one year.2  He had never been
convicted-nor ever been tried-because his low I.Q. led courts to
find him incompetent to stand trial in all four cases, resulting in
hospitalization and not incarceration.' While on a Christmas
furlough from the hospital, Minnix broke into the apartment of a
23-year-old resident of Pierce County, Washington, "removed a
light bulb", and waited.' When she arrived home, he tied her up
and raped her.' The public reacted to the brazen attack with
outrage; many wondered how someone so "dangerous" was given
the opportunity to commit yet another violent sex crime. The
state legislature quickly and unanimously responded.6 Largely
due to this crime and others like it, Washington, followed by
nineteen other states,8 implemented sexually violent predator
I See Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators', L.A. TIMES (May 10, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-05-10/news/mn-1433_1_sexual-predator.
See id.
* See id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010-.903 (2009).
8 Sexually Violent Predator statutes are now on the books in twenty states:
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See
Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration
at What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, 215 (2011). In 2006, Congress passed the
Adam Walsh Act, which established a federal SVP framework for the federal
government. Id. at 216; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707 (2009); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 6600 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. § 394.910-.932 (2009); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 207/1-99 (West 2009); IOWA CODE § 229A.1-.16 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a01-a23 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1-16 (West 2009); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.01-.23 (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480-.513 (West 2009);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174-174.03 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:1-23
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("SVP") statutes under which the state could commit and hold
individuals like Minnix-individuals we now colloquially call
"predators."9
It has been more than twenty-five years since Minnix's
crime. And after twenty states changed their laws, forked over
millions of taxpayer dollars,'o and weathered the onslaught from
(2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24-.38 (West 2009); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§§ 10.01-.17 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1-01-46 (2009); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6401-6409 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10-170 (2008); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2009); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 37.2-
900-920 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.903 (West 2009); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 980.01-.14 (West 2009).
9 Branding these individuals as "predators" may be becoming unpopular. See
DEIRDRE M. D'ORAZIO ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA COALITION ON SEXUAL OFFENDING,
THE CALIFORNIA SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE: HISTORY, DESCRIPTION &
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 56 (2009), available at http://ccoso.org/papers/
CCOSO%20SVP%20Paper.pdf ("The goal of the SVP statute, to enhance community
safety, is not optimally served through use of the emotionally charged label 'Sexually
Violent Predator.'. . . The 'Sexually Violent Predator' label sends the message that
those committed are more animal than human and this sub-human nature renders
them incapable of change.").
10 The annual cost of SVP commitment per SVP ranges from just under
$100,000 a year to just under $200,000 a year per SVP, depending on the state. See
D'ORAZIO, supra note 9, at 2 (in California, the annual cost per SVP is $166,000);
Rick Brundrett, Sex Offenders Receive Big Bills From State Mental Health Agency,
THE NERVE (Nov. 3, 2011, 8:45 AM), http://scthenerve.wordpress.com/2Oll/11/03/
sex-offenders-receive-big-bills-from-state-mental-health-agency/ (noting that the
average yearly cost of the SVP program in South Carolina is more than $97,000);
Gary Craig, Civil Confinement of Sex Offenders Costs State $175,000 Apiece,
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRON. (Dec. 24, 2010, 2:33 PM)
httpJ/www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20101226/NEWSO1/12260311 (in New
York, SVP commitment costs $175,000 per year per detainee); Elizabeth Hillgrove,
Sexually Violent Predator Program Needs More Funds, WATCHDOG.ORG (July 5,
2010), http://watchdog.org/300/vashn-sexually-violent-predator-program-needs-more
-funds/ (SVP program costs $91,000 per detainee).
SVP commitment is exponentially more expensive than the average cost of
housing an individual in state prison. See Solomon Moore, Prison Spending Outpaces
All But Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/
us/03prison.html (noting that a survey of 34 states found an average of $29,000 per
prisoner per year was spent); see also D'ORAZIO, supra note 9, at 2 (in California, it
is $43,000 annually); Brundrett, supra (average annual cost of housing a state
prisoner in South Carolina is $15,963).
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academia," one stark truth still exists: Under multiple states'
SVP statutes' current criteria, Minnix would not be eligible for
commitment as an SVP. Not in 1988, nor in 2014.
Seventeen years after the Supreme Court declared SVP
statutes constitutional in Kansas v. Hendricks,12 Gary Minnix's
example demonstrates a glaring defect in the analysis applied
thus far: While SVP statutes might survive due process
challenges and meet the rational basis test for equal protection
purposes, they are not reasonably calculated to protect the
public. SVP statutes, like quarantine statutes, are public safety
measures under the states' police powers, designed to employ
preventive detention in appropriate cases to protect the public
from harm. SVP statutes must properly balance the individual's
interest in avoiding detention against the state's police power to
protect the public. The evaluation of such statutes requires that
the preventive detention schemes meet a four-part test: They
must be necessary; the coercion they employ must be
proportionate to the harm threatened and must have a least
restrictive alternative component; their application must be
verifiable; and they must be fair." This well established four-
part standard can be used to evaluate SVP statutes where the
imprecise approach of the Court has failed and can benefit both
the targets of the laws and their potential victims.
To apply this novel public health review, this Article
scrutinizes one aspect of SVP statutes-their "entrance
criteria"--to highlight, examine, and attempt to remedy the
failings of SVP statutes. This Article's analysis relies on the
public health function of quarantine" and the legal and public
11 See Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish
Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1205-06 n.47 (2000) (listing scholars who have
criticized SVP legislation); Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil
Commitment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1383,
1425 n.359 (2008) (noting that "many academics have argued that civil commitment
statutes for sexually violent predators are unconstitutional").
12 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
" See infra Part IV.
14 To allay confusion, this Article will refer throughout to the joint enterprise of
isolation and quarantine as "quarantine." There are important features that
distinguish the two, but they will not be dispositive for the instant analysis. See
Leslie A. Jacobs, Rights and Quarantine During the SARS Global Health Crisis:
Differentiated Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto, 41 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 511, 521-22 (2007) (defining isolation as "the confinement of a
symptomatic person," and quarantine as "the confinement of asymptomatic
persons"); Heidi L. Lambertson, Swatting a Bug Without a Flyswatter: Minimizing
850 [Vol. 87:847
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policy analysis that has long been applied to the evaluation of
states' use of this preventive detention tool. In reviewing SVP
laws, the Court has gestured to quarantine as an analogous
public safety tool long accepted as within states' police power."
Neither the Court nor commentators, however, have applied to
SVP laws the form of evaluative scrutiny well-established in the
review of quarantine laws. Instead the review of SVP statutes
has rather aridly applied constitutional analysis as though the
use of state police power for preventive detention was a question
of first impression. Applying public health law to SVP statutes
situates them within a well-worn jurisprudential and public
policy landscape, raising serious questions about the statutes'
continued validity. These tools also suggest a way forward to
both protect the public and to safeguard the liberty interests at
stake for those subject to these laws.
This Article undertakes this public health review in five
parts. Part I considers the general structure of SVP statutes,
noting the reasoning behind the enactment and implementation
of these statutes. Part II focuses the analysis on examples of
three different types of SVP statutes' limiting criteria by
considering SVP laws from New Jersey, Wisconsin, Virginia, and
California. Part III compares the preventive detentions of SVP
commitment and quarantine. Part IV applies quarantine
principles to the SVP framework, and, after concluding that SVP
statutes, as currently configured, do not sufficiently withstand
this public health critique, Part V proposes solutions.
I. BUILDING THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR FRAMEWORK
A. The Road to Implementation
Although it has spread nationwide, the origins of the SVP
movement can be traced to three sex crimes that occurred in the
Seattle metropolitan area in the 1980s. In addition to Minnix's
the Impact of Disease Control on Individual Liberty Under the Revised International
Health Regulations, 25 PENN ST. INTL L. REV. 531, 549 (2006) (describing
quarantine as the "restriction of activities or the separation of a healthy person who
has been exposed to an infectious disease" and isolation as "separation of a known
infected person.").
15 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366 (upholding Kansas' SVP statute as civil in
nature, and noting, "[a] State could hardly be seen as furthering a 'punitive' purpose
by involuntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious
disease").
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sexual assault, 6 two other crimes grabbed headlines. First, Gene
Raymond Kane, an individual officials knew was dangerous and
had a history of attacking women, raped and killed 29-year-old
Diane Ballasiotes after she left work in downtown Seattle in the
autumn of 1988.' In May 1989, Earl K. Shriner, a mentally
disabled man with a history of mental illness and sordid criminal
acts, attacked 7-year-old Ryan Hade while he was riding his bike
through his neighborhood.'" Shriner choked, raped, and
mutilated Hade, leaving him to die.'9
Following the attack on Hade, public outrage reached a
boiling point. Citizens' responses were "unprecedented," as
Washingtonians sought a legal solution that would keep
individuals like Kane, Minnix, and Shriner off the streets.2 0
Washington established a task force, and within months the
Washington State Community Protection Act of 1990 was in
draft form.2 ' During the drumbeat toward passage, the state
legislature seemed focused exclusively on public safety. State
congressmen argued that it was "time to address the public's
concern for safety and not concern for criminal rights," and that
"[t]he Constitution was never meant to coddle these people," and
that even mandatory mutilation of sex offenders should be
considered.2 2 Ida Ballasiotes, the mother of Diane, asked,
"What's wrong with a holding pen [for sex offenders]?"23
The Act unanimously passed both houses of the state
legislature and was so wildly popular with the public that many
"hesitated" to speak out against it.2 4  The public fervor was
undeniable: Two of the authors of the legislation expressed relief
when the vote was over, having feared that the bill would grow
even tougher before passage.2 5
16 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
17 See Siegel, supra note 1.
18 Id.; see also Bryan Johnson, 'Little Tacoma Boy' Was Upbeat, Despite Horrors
He Survived, KOMONEWS.COM (June 22, 2005, 10:41 PM), http://www.komo
news.com/news/archive/4155976.html.
a Siegel, supra note 1. Hade survived the attack but died in a motorcycle
accident in 2005. Johnson, supra note 18.
20 Siegel, supra note 1.
21 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010-.903 (2001).
22 Siegel, supra note 1.
23 Id.
24 Id.
2 Id.
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After Washington, Kansas 26 and other states27 followed suit;
each did so in the name of public safety.2 8 Even though
legislatures included an accompanying goal of treatment for sex
offenders, a sample of legislative findings that accompany SVP
statutes clearly shows that lawmakers supported SVPs primarily
to protect the public. Statutes refer to SVPs as "extremely
dangerous,"2 9 with a high "likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of
predatory sexual violence"30 presenting "dangers" and "risks" to
the community. 1
A concern for public safety similarly led to passage of an SVP
statute at the federal level. On July 27, 2006, President George
W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh Act,32 in which Congress
authorized SVP commitment for those in federal custody,
26 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29A01-A23 (2003).
27 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 394.910-.932 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24-
.38 (West 1999).
2 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.25 ("Therefore, it is necessary to modify
the involuntary civil commitment process in recognition of the need for commitment
of those sexually violent predators who pose a danger to others should they be
returned to society.").
29 FLA. STAT. § 394.910 (1999) ("The Legislature finds that a small but
extremely dangerous number of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a
mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary
treatment.. . ."); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2001) ("The legislature finds that a
small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not
have a mental disease or defect. .. ."); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2003)
(noting that existing civil commitment is "inadequate to address the special needs of
sexually violent predators and the risks they present to society").
20 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2001).
31 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2003); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01
(McKinney 2007) ("In extreme cases, confinement of the most dangerous offenders
will need to be extended by civil process in order to provide them such treatment and
to protect the public from their recidivistic conduct."). The statutes also note the
importance of treatment. Id. ("[Tihe system should offer meaningful forms of
treatment to sex offenders in all criminal and civil phases, including during
incarceration, civil commitment, and outpatient supervision."); FLA. STAT. § 394.910
("It is therefore the intent of the Legislature to create a civil commitment procedure
for the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators."); WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.09.010 (noting that the "treatment needs of this population are very long
term, and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the
traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the
involuntary treatment act").
32 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Signs H.R. 4472, the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-6.
html.
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complementing the growing chorus of states nationwide.
Focusing on the protective aspect of the statute and its most
uncontroversial beneficiaries, Bush spoke at the Act's signing:
Protecting our children is our solemn responsibility. It's what
we must do. When a child's life or innocence is taken it is a
terrible loss-it's an act of unforgivable cruelty. Our society has
a duty to protect our children from exploitation and danger. By
enacting this law we're sending a clear message across the
country: [T]hose who prey on our children will be caught,
prosecuted and punished to the fullest extent of the law.33
Notwithstanding the rhetoric, the commitment provision
under the Act is not limited to offenses against children but gives
the U.S. Attorney General discretion 3 4 to commence hearings
following a finding of "sexually violent conduct"35  or child
molestation. Many hailed the Act as an important tool in
"keep[ing] our children safe."3
B. SVP Background and Failed Constitutional Attacks
SVP statutes authorize the commitment of "sexually
dangerous individuals"3 or "sexually violent predators"3 for as
long as they remain a perceived threat to society.40 To be
branded such an "individual" or "predator," three entrance
criteria must be met. First, the individual must be found
3 Id.
' See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2012) ("[T1he Attorney General or any individual
authorized by the Attorney General or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may
certify that the person is a sexually dangerous person.").
," "Sexually violent conduct" is not defined in the statute. See Timms v. Johns,
700 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771-72 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (holding the Act overbroad because it
did not define "sexually violent conduct"), vacated, 627 F.3d 525 (4th Cir. 2010).
" See 18 § U.S.C. 4247(a)(5).
3 Ensign, Reid Announce Grants for Nevada Sex Offender Tracking, Child
Protection, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 15, 2008; see also Paul J. Morrison,
Legislature Must Fix Loophole and Protect Kansas Kids, U.S. STATES NEWS, Jan. 29,
2007 ("Congress recently passed the Adam Walsh Act, and Kansas needs to match
this commitment to our children's safety.").
3 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2011).
9 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18)
(2009); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2007).
40 Even though state SVP statutes provide for review of the detention, see, e.g,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08(a) (2010) (requiring annual review of the SVP
commitment), very few individuals committed under these regimes have ever been
released. See infra text accompanying note 65.
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mentally "abnormal."4 ' This condition is defined by statute, not
psychiatric diagnosis.4 2 Second, the individual must be
dangerous, demonstrated by serious difficulty in controlling his
or her sexual urges such that he or she will be likely' to commit
sexual crimes in the future." Finally, individuals must initially
qualify by satisfying what will be referred to as the SVP states'
"triggering behavior," or "trigger," which, between states, is quite
divergent. This Article focuses on these divergent triggering
mechanisms.
"I This is typically defined as a "mental condition that affects a person's
emotional, cognitive or volitional capacity in a manner that predisposes that person
to commit acts of sexual violence." E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 1999);
see also WIs. STAT. § 980.01(2) (2007) (using the term "mental disorder," Wisconsin's
definition tracks New Jersey's: "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual
violence").
42 Professor Stephen J. Morse has criticized the hollow definition of mental
abnormality. See Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 62 (2004).
In other words, the definition is simply a (partial) generic description of the
causation of all behavior and it is not a limiting definition of abnormality.
All behavior is (partially) caused by emotional and volitional abilities that
have been themselves caused by congenital and acquired characteristics.
The condition that makes sexual predation mentally abnormal-congenital
or acquired causes of a predisposition-applies to all behavior and is thus
vacuous. It certainly cannot explain why the (inevitable) presence of
congenital and acquired causes of a predisposition means that the agent
cannot control himself and is not responsible for action that expresses the
predisposition.
Id. (emphasis added).
a Under the original version of Wisconsin's SVP Act, an individual was eligible
if he or she suffered from a disorder "that [made] it substantially probable that the
person [would] engage in acts of sexual violence." WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7), 93 Wis. Act
479, 1562 (1993) (emphasis added). But it now reads "likely that the person will
engage in one or more acts of sexual violence." WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2007). Likely
is defined as "more likely than not." WIS. STAT. § 980.01(lm).
" See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-12 (2002) (holding that a complete
lack of control is not required, but due process requires that some lack-of-control
determination must be made in order to authorize the commitment). Some state
supreme courts have held that Crane requires an explicit finding of lack-of-control,
and has mandated such a finding in its SVP hearings. See, e.g., In re Detention of
Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003); Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 790-92
(Mo. 2002); In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 215-17, 219 (N.J. 2002).
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Examples of triggering acts include being charged with a
sexually violent crime,4 5 being convicted of a sexually violent
crime, 6 or being currently incarcerated for a sexually violent
crime. 7 If all three criteria are met, under current SVP statutes,
the state has an unquestionable right to detain these
individuals. 8 In contrast, individuals who meet the first two
requirements-those who are both mentally abnormal and
dangerous, with difficulty controlling their behavior-but who
fail to meet the triggering behavior criterion are categorically
excluded from SVP commitment.
The statutes have proven unquestionably controversial," as
the laws oblige states to commit individuals based upon what
they "might do" instead of what they "have done."s0 SVP statutes
do not share the criminal law's primary goals of backward-
looking retribution or deterrence;"' instead, forward-looking
incapacitation or detainment and some measure of treatment 52
are their aims. However, unlike traditional mental health civil
commitment, which allows for the preventive detention of those
41 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18) (2009) ("'Sexually violent
predator' means any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of
sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not
confined in a secure facility.").
48 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26.
4 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601 (West 2011).
4 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (upholding the
constitutionality of Kansas's statute).
4 See Morris, supra note 11.
"o See Lave, supra note 8, at 213. For a compelling thesis on why society is
becoming more comfortable with "preventive" action, and more generally, preventive
detention-from sexually violent predator statutes to the detention of suspected
terrorists, see Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the
Demand for the Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 729, 731 (2011). Margulies argues that a triumvirate of movements:
(1) society's increased desire to "purge the community of the undesirable elements by
dramatically increasing the government's power to monitor, exclude, restrain, and
imprison those considered a threat," (2) a refinement of "security" which seeks an
elimination of risk, and (3) an increased call in criminal procedure for protection by
the state, have resulted in increased preventive detention. Id. Some scholars have
begun to argue for an extension of preventive detention regimes that would establish
commitment without requiring a showing of mental illness. See, e.g., Adam
Lamparello, Why Wait Until the Crime Happens? Providing for the Involuntary
Commitment of Dangerous Individuals Without Requiring a Showing of Mental
Illness, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 875 (2011).
"' See generally SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 79-105 (8th ed. 2007).
62 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
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mentally ill and dangerous," SVP commitment requires an
additional "triggering behavior" finding.' As a result, the
statutes seek to detain those who may or will probably commit a
sexually violent act in the future, as long as they fall into a
category of one of the state's narrowed classes of individuals.
Much of this debate-played out from the classroom to the
courtroom-surrounding SVP statutes has been whether the
statutes themselves are facially constitutional-namely, whether
they are punitive and violate the due process, double jeopardy,
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution."5 Although
interesting, this debate is largely settled because its line of
attack has been explicitly foreclosed: The due process challenge
to these SVP statutes was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Kansas v. Hendricks, where the Court principally held that,
because the statutes were civil in nature, the state's sweeping
power to detain citizens it deems potentially dangerous could not
be denied."
Putting aside due process challenges, the easiest way to
address and critique these discriminatory triggering behaviors-
from a constitutional perspective-would appear to be by way of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
However, the variety of potential challenges in this arena will
also likely be met with failure."s Nevertheless, such an
" See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (reading a
dangerousness requirement into Wisconsin's civil commitment statute).
*' See infra Part II.
" See generally Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (discussing constitutional concerns in
turn).
* See id.
* The two major U.S. Supreme Court decisions in this area-Hendricks and
Crane-never once mention equal protection, but rather focus on due process, double
jeopardy, and ex post facto challenges.
In United States v. Comstock, the Court decided that Congress did have the
constitutional power to establish the Adam Walsh Act, the federal SVP Act, and did
not address equal protection arguments. 560 U.S. 126, 133, 149-50 (2010). To this
point, Justice Breyer explicitly noted, "We do not reach or decide any claim that the
statute or its application denies equal protection of the laws . ... Respondents are
free to pursue those claims on remand...." Id. at 149-50. Subsequently on remand,
the Fourth Circuit held that the Act's standard of proof for demonstrating one as
"sexually dangerous" did not violate due process, but did not discuss the Act's
constitutionality under the equal protection clause. United States v. Comstock, 627
F.3d 513, 524-25 (4th Cir. 2010).
1 Many state courts conclude that the state is free to only detain sexually
violent predators and not other violent offenders, see, e.g., In re Morrow, 616 N.W.2d
544, 548 (Iowa 2000), free to detain those with mental illness and not those without,
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argument, first posed by Professor Grant Morris fourteen years
ago," seeks to demonstrate that these triggering distinctions fail
equal protection review, making the entire statutory framework
constitutionally infirm. Even though there has been recent
movement by a court in this area,6 0 improvement of the worst
see, e.g., In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 186-87 (Minn. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 1011
(1997), affd on remand, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999), and free to subject SVPs to
conditions different from those of other civilly committed persons, see In re Detention
of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ill. 2000); In re Detention of Williams, 628
N.W.2d 447, 451-53 (Iowa 2001); Merryfield v. State, 241 P.3d 573, 578 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2010).
6* See Morris, supra note 11, at 1227.
60 In 2011, the Eastern District of North Carolina handed down United States v.
Timms, declaring the federal SVP statute, the Adam Walsh Act, unconstitutional
because it failed rational basis review under the equal protection clause, as applied
to Gerald Wayne Timms. 799 F. Supp. 2d 582, 599 (E.D.N.C. 2011) [hereinafter
Timms I]. The court agreed with Mr. Timms' argument that the Act irrationally
discriminated between those who were housed in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons at the time of SVP commitment (to whom the Act applied, including Mr.
Timms), and those who were not in its custody (to whom it did not). See
18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2012).
Although its decision noted that the government's interest in "shielding the
public from sexually dangerous individuals" was legitimate, the court found the
distinction between those inside and outside federal custody was not rationally
related to this purpose. Timms I, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 589, 591-92. The court noted
that
[slexually dangerous individuals undoubtedly exist in state custody, the
custody of the United States territorial local government, and in the
general public. Yet § 4248 makes no attempt to reach those individuals.
This distinction makes little sense. There is no basis for believing that
more sexually dangerous individuals are in federal custody than elsewhere.
Id. at 591-92. After the court concluded by noting that "[i]f the federal government
does not have the power to equally apply its civil commitment scheme to everyone,
then it should not civilly commit anyone." Id. at 591.
Six months later, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, and gutted the equal
protection holding. See United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 456 (4th Cir. 2012)
[hereinafter Timms ll]. Relying heavily on the presumptive validity of classifications
subject to rational basis review, the court concluded that a rational basis did exist
for Congress to authorize commitment only for individuals in prison custody and not
those out of custody. Id. at 447, 449. In a striking passage, the court concluded that
Congress' distinction was rational because "Congress, unlike the several states,
lacks a general police power." Id. at 448. Concluding that "Congress may legislate
incrementally," the court's holding seemed limited to Congress: "Because the scope of
the federal government's authority as to civil commitment differs so significantly from
a state's authority, we conclude that there is a rational basis for the distinction
Congress drew."Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
At a minimum, the Fourth Circuit in Timms II does not answer the question as
to whether a state, as opposed to Congress, could apply the same distinction. An
aggressive reading implies that a similar distinction made by states would not
survive constitutional review. Id.
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effects of triggering behavior requirements through rational basis
equal protection analysis still seems unlikely.6 ' Because
constitutional arguments have repeatedly failed as a means to
address apparent inconsistencies in SVP statutes, neither the
time-worn due process challenge, nor the equal protection
arguments, is explored further in this Article. Instead, this
Article completes a review of SVP statutes based upon well-
established public health laws, policies and ethics ("public health
review" or "PHR").
In general, SVP statutes are unique in that they provide for
detention of individuals who have served, and often finished,
criminal sentences; specifically, this feature has caused scholars
to question their validity and fairness.6 2 Although the Supreme
Court has concluded that SVP commitment does not constitute
1 Courts hold that a state's disparate treatment of various groups eligible for
SVP commitment meets the rational basis test. See Timms II, 664 F.3d 436, 449
(holding that the Adam Walsh Act's distinction between those in custody and those
outside of custody was rational and did not violate equal protection); In re
Commitment of Bushong, 815 N.E.2d 103, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("[Tlhe legislature
could have rationally determined that persons who have already been adjudicated
sexually violent beyond a reasonable doubt pose a greater risk to society than those
whose sexual dangerousness has not been established in a prior criminal
proceeding."); State v. Talikka, 469 N.E.2d 888, 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (rational
basis exists for forcing those committed after being acquitted by reason of insanity to
pay for treatment services, while exempting those incompetent to stand trial or
convicted); Enis v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 962 F.Supp. 1192, 1202 (Wis. App.
Ct. 1996) (rejecting an equal protection argument where those civilly committed
were provided a guardian to assist in determining whether they are competent to
refuse treatment but those found not guilty by reason of insanity were not, largely
because the two groups of individuals were not "similarly situated" and even if they
were, "a good reason exist[ed] for treating them differently" because "a guardian is
helpful in determining a ward's true wishes" but not an individual found not guilty
by reason of insanity). But see Bernstein v. Pataki, 233 F. App'x 21, 26 (2d Cir. 2007)
(striking down disparate treatment between those acquitted by reason of insanity
and those incompetent to stand trial after applying intermediate scrutiny).
62 See Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1025, 1054 (2002).
In the case of Leroy Hendricks, for example, the criminal justice system
blamed and punished him for yielding to his allegedly uncontrollable urges;
the sexual predator commitment system in effect excused him, found him
non-responsible, because it committed him on the ground that he could not
control precisely the same urges and related conduct that led to the ten-
year prison sentence for sexual molestation that preceded his commitment.
But how could it be fair to hold responsible and punish an agent for
yielding to urges that are impossible or supremely difficult to control?
Id.
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lifelong confinement, release of an SVP is a rare occurrence: Of
the 4,50064 that had been detained nationwide as of August of
2007, 494 had ever been released-constituting about eleven
percent."
This result can be attributed to two powerful factors. First,
release of SVPs into the community is undeniably politically
unpopular.6  The public's strong reaction is undoubtedly stoked
by the increased publicity that now accompanies an SVP's
release thanks to community notification laws.67  Further
inflaming the public's fear of these individuals, SVPs are
commonly colloquially referred to as the "worst of the worst"68
" See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363, 364 (1997) ("Hendricks focuses
on his confinement's potentially indefinite duration as evidence of the State's
punitive intent. That focus, however, is misplaced. Far from any punitive objective,
the confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated purposes of the
commitment .... Furthermore, commitment under the Act is only potentially
indefinite.").
6 See WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS
AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006
UPDATE, REVISED (August 2007) [hereinafter COMPARISON], available at
http-//www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf.
* See id.
6 See Lisa Kavanaugh, Massachusetts's Sexually Dangerous Persons
Legislation: Can Juries Make a Bad Law Better?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509,
516 (2000) (calling the "decision to release a sex offender" "politically unpopular");
see also Keith Matheny, Releases of Sexually Violent Predators Anger Local Areas,
USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-03-
predator-housingN.htm. As of spring 2010, only nineteen men had "ever been
granted conditional release" from California's SVP framework. Id. Mention of the
newly-released SVP Steven Willett was highly controversial in the small town of
Desert Center, California. Id. ("At the Desert Center Caf6, less than a half-mile from
Willett's home, bring up his name and the outrage rises in waitress and nearby
resident Cheryl Magsam's voice."); see also Kelly Wheeler, Two Sexually Violent
Predators Ordered Released to Home Near Jacumba, CITY NEWS SERVICE, June 20,
2008 (residents living in a small town where an SVP was ordered released called
decision to release "disgusting" and a small group of citizens told the judge "that
they didn't want the sexually violent predators living ... one mile from their small
town"); Classification of Sex Offenders: Frequently Asked Questions, WASH. ASS'N OF
SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, http://www.sheriffalerts.com/cap-safety_1.php?office=
54528 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) ("People respond in many different ways to
receiving a sex offender notification. It is normal to feel upset, angry, and worried
about a sex offender living in your community.").
67 See Tamara Rice Lave, Thinking Critically About How To Address Violence
Against Women, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 923, 932 (2011) (noting that community
notification laws, which require "that the public be notified of an offender's presence
in the neighborhood[,] ... exist in every state across the country").
6 See Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as a
War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 573
(2004) (sex offenders are "styled as 'the worst of the worst' as a consequence. . . of
[Vol. 87:847860
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and untreatable."9 In addition to the negative public reaction, a
second powerful reason is the statutes' reliance on the inherent
uncertainty of prediction; this leads courts and judges to simply
"punt" and conclude that an SVP is not ready for release.7 0 The
personal cost of making a mistake is simply too much to bear.
One scholar writes:
[0]nce individuals are labeled sexually violent predators and
committed as a result, they will realize that their ultimate
release is extremely unlikely. Release will be difficult as a
result of the program staff's inevitable disinclination to predict
nonrecidivism, given the general difficulties of making
predictions in this area, as well as the high costs to the clinical
evaluator of false-negative predictions and the low cost of
making false-positive ones."
This framework is further driven by the persistent but
highly questionable assumption that those committed as SVPs
are unusually likely to recidivate.7 2 As a result, even with
procedural protections, 3 the built-in disincentives for release
make it particularly rare.
their sex offense"); John Q. LaFond, Outpatient Commitment's Next Frontier: Sexual
Predators, 9 PSCYHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 159, 179-80 (2003) ("[Tlhese individuals
have been so demonized by terms like 'sexually violent predators' and 'the worst of
the worst.' ").
69 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365-66 (1997) (accepting the fact that
Hendricks was untreatable and noting that "we have never held that the
Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is
available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others"). However, the success of
sex offender treatment remains unclear. See Jill S. Levenson et al., Public
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES
Soc. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2007), available at http://ccoso.org/library%2Oarticles/
PublicPerceptions%20ASAP%207.pdf (noting that studies have concluded that
recidivism rates of those treated and untreated are undifferentiated, but that
"contemporary cognitive-behavior treatment" has been noticeably successful).
70 See Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 543-44 (1998).
71 Id.
72 See Levenson, supra note 69, at 6 ("[Sleveral studies by both the U.S. and
Canadian governments ... found sex offense recidivism rates to be much lower than
commonly believed."). A Department of Justice study concluded that 5.3 percent of
sex offenders recidivated within three years of their release. Id. "Even over longer
follow-up periods of 15 years, researchers have established that the large majority
(76%) of sexual offenders were not rearrested for new sex crimes." Id.
7 See Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act
Lowered the Threshold For Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 391, 402-03 (2011) (noting that the SVP statutes provide similar
protections to traditional mental illness civil commitment). The procedural
protections credited by the Supreme Court in Hendricks included annual judicial
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II. HANDICAPPED BY LIMITATIONS
If SVP statutes were created to address public safety
concerns and prevent public safety threats, their implementation
has been clouded by practical concerns related to their
application. Namely, if the state intends to detain those deemed
most imminently "sexually dangerous," then it is rather
unremarkable to say that the tangential questions of whether the
individual (1) has been previously convicted or not for his or her
antisocial acts, (2) was irrational at the time he or she committed
a sexual act or at trial, or (3) lives in a prison or under a bridge,"
should not be determinative in deciding whether the individual
can be held by the state as an SVP. But they are.
As mentioned above, these statutes allow for commitment
where three showings are made: mental abnormality, lack of
control such that one is likely to be dangerous, and a triggering
mechanism, which varies by state. What follows is an analysis
and review of SVP statutes' third required finding-the
triggering behavior requirement. This requirement drastically
limits the number of people subject to SVP commitment, but its
limitations may or may not have anything to do with the
individual's likelihood of committing a sexually violent crime in
the near future. As a result, the SVP statutes' triggers loosen the
tight bond between dangerousness and detention, opening the
statutes up for a substantial PHR critique. This is demonstrated
proceedings to recommit the individuals detained under the SVP as well as the
reasonable doubt standard that is applied to SVP hearings. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
364.
" See Cynthia A. King, Fighting the Devil We Don't Know: Kansas v. Hendricks,
A Case Study Exploring the Civilization of Criminal Punishment and Its
Ineffectiveness in Preventing Child Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1427, 1465
n.240 (1999) ("Health care professionals acknowledge that individuals incarcerated
under a sexual violent predator law are unlikely to be released, despite the state's
argument that sexually violent predators would be granted periodic review and
potential release. . ." (citations omitted)).
7 Many states desire to keep these individuals far away from the rest of society
and have passed residency requirements for sex offenders. Perhaps nowhere has this
been more severe than Florida, where many former sex offenders have a particularly
limited area in which they can live. This has resulted in "sex offender colonies," most
notably in Miami under the Mary Tuttle Causeway Bridge, where former sex
offenders live. See John Zarrella & Patrick Oppmann, Florida Housing Sex
Offenders Under Bridge, CNN.COM (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/
04/05/bridge.sex.offenders/.
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by the different types of triggering behaviors required in (1) New
Jersey, (2) Wisconsin and Virginia, and (3) California and the
federal Adam Walsh Act.
A. New Jersey: The Criminal Charge Distinction
New Jersey's triggering behavior is comparatively broad.
Those eligible for SVP commitment in the state must belong to
one of four groups: those who have (1) "been convicted,"
(2) "adjudicated delinquent," (3) "found not guilty by reason of
insanity," or (4) "been charged with a sexually violent offense but
found to be incompetent to stand trial."" In seeking to commit
an individual as an SVP who has been found incompetent to
stand trial, the state has established further procedures in which
the accused is factually tried-without a jury-in order to
"determine whether the person did commit the act charged."77 If
the court finds that the incompetent individual committed the act
charged, the person may be held as an SVP. 7 1 Overall, New
Jersey subjects more classes of individuals to SVP commitment
than many other states, but it still exempts a number of
individuals from its scope.
For example, one could easily imagine the mentally
abnormal and dangerous individual who, in addition to being
previously found neither insane nor incompetent, has also never
been previously convicted of bad acts. Consider the individual
with antisocial personality disorder" who has been charged with
sex crimes on two different occasions but has never been found
guilty. Perhaps the juries in both cases may have believed the
individual was more likely than not guilty but never felt
comfortable finding beyond a reasonable doubt because the
state's proof did not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard-perhaps by lab errors or a careful offender, no DNA
evidence was ever found at the scene.8 o Because the individual
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 1999).
77 Id. § 30:4-27.33.
78 Id.
7 Antisocial personality disorder is characterized by a lack of concern regarding
society's rules, violations of the rights of others, lack of regard for the truth, and
unlawful behavior, among other characteristics. See DIAGNOsTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 702-03 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, 4th ed. 2000).
8 Granted, criminal law theorists may have difficulty with this characterization
and would likely classify this point as a critique of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. But the point here is simpler. If state legislatures' goals prioritize
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has never been convicted, he or she cannot be detained as a New
Jersey SVP. Perhaps to combat this issue, some states-such as
Washington-allow for the branding of such an individual as an
SVP by only requiring a criminal charge."'
But this too is imperfect. Imagine the individual who is
readying to commit a first sexual offense. A concerned parent or
friend notices increasingly risky behavior and is convinced that
harm is imminent. Traditional mental health civil
commitment-allowing the commitment of individuals found
mentally ill and dangerous-would be unavailable for an
individual who is currently dangerous, but not diagnosed with
any mental disorder.8 2 Also unavailable-because of the criminal
disposition requirement-is New Jersey's SVP commitment. As
a result, New Jersey has established a system in which the
community must wait for a first criminal offense before
commitment; noncriminal overt acts strongly indicative of
imminent harm are not enough to get the individual committed
as an SVP."'
Or, perhaps most disturbingly realistic, imagine the
individual who is able to evade detection from authorities and is
able to abuse multiple children over a period of several years.
Because the person has never been formally charged or
convicted, abusive acts continue unabated. Again, in New
Jersey, this individual would never be contemplated by the SVP
scheme because the antisocial acts do not qualify as triggering
behavior."
New Jersey's statute, when viewed in light of a potential
alternative-that the fact-finder could simply take a prior
criminal conviction into account when deciding whether or not
the individual is imminently sexually dangerous-is too limiting.
Creating such a distinction allows for the wildly disparate
prevention and not punishment, why link the civil SVP statute to the criminal law
standard that limits the state's punitive power?
" See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (2009) (defining a "sexually violent
predator" as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined
in a secure facility" (emphasis added)).
82 Under traditional civil commitment, the individual must be mentally
disordered and dangerous. See Lessard v. Shmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 & 1096
(E.D. Wis. 1972) vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
1 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 1999).
* See id.
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treatment of two seemingly similar classes of individuals:
imminently sexually dangerous people who have been convicted
and imminently sexually dangerous people who have not been
convicted.8 5 This is particularly odd considering the unequivocal
language of a New Jersey state court that upheld the quarantine
of a homeless individual with tuberculosis.8 6 In the clear words
of that court, "[dlangerous conduct is not the same as criminal
conduct."8 7
B. Wisconsin and Virginia: Inversely Insane and Incompetent
Wisconsin and Virginia carve out certain individuals from
SVP eligibility that New Jersey includes. In Wisconsin, those
who have been (1) "convicted of a sexually violent offense,"
(2) "adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense," or
(3) "found not guilty of or not responsible for" a sexually violent
offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness"
are subject to the SVP statute.89 In Virginia, those "convicted of
a sexually violent offense" and those "charged with a sexually
violent offense and . .. unrestorably incompetent to stand trial"
are subject to SVP commitment.90
85 See Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The
Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 805 (1996)
(noting that "there is no good explanation of why the presumption of harmlessness
may not be defeated by evidence of dangerousness without evidence of a prior
crime").
86 City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 278 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
87 Id. at 275.
8 See Wis. STAT. § 971.15(1) (1993) ("A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect the
person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or
her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law."). As such, the
Wisconsin insanity defense standard recognizes the volitional excuse. Ironically,
however, the Wisconsin SVP statute requires the same finding, providing a situation
in which a finding of lack of control-which is required in order to commit an
individual under the Wisconsin SVP statute-would serve to excuse the same
individual from criminal punishment. See Jeremy T. Price, Reconciling Morality and
Moral Responsibility in the Law: A Due Process Challenge to the Inconsistent Mental
Responsibility Standards at Play in Criminal Insanity Defenses and Sexually Violent
Predator Civil Commitment Hearings, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 987, 1001 (2005).
89 See Wis. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2007). SVP statutes in California, Florida,
Missouri, and Texas also do not reach those found incompetent to stand trial. See
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 394.912 (2008); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 632.480 (West 2001); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003 (West
1999).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2009).
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As a result, in Wisconsin, those found incompetent to stand
trial" are not included in the statutory definition of those eligible
for SVP commitment." In Virginia, the opposite is true: Those
found not guilty by reason of insanity are excluded, but those
found incompetent to stand trial are included in the state's SVP
scheme."
By dividing these two groups of individuals, both state
legislatures seem to be indicating that the time at which the
individual experiences a mental deficit is determinative when
analyzing who is likely to commit sex crimes in the future." In
Wisconsin, the individual who, at the time of trial, is unable to
understand the charges against him or her or to assist in his or
her own defense' 5 is exempted from the state's SVP statute, while
the individual who, at the time of the offense, "lacked substantial
capacity .. . to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct"
is subject to potential SVP commitment.96  Put differently, an
individual who commits a sexual crime with the full knowledge
9' See Wis. STAT. § 971.13(1) ("No person who lacks substantial mental capacity
to understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own defense may be tried,
convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity
endures.").
9 See id. § 980.01(7) ("Sexually violent person" means a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for a
sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness,
and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it
likely that the person will engage in one or more acts of sexual violence.).
9' See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 ("Sexually violent predator" means any person
who (i) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, or has been charged with a
sexually violent offense and is unrestorably incompetent to stand trial pursuant to
§ 19.2-169.3; and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds
it difficult to control his predatory behavior, which makes him likely to engage in
sexually violent acts.).
I Those who claim that they are incompetent to stand trial must demonstrate
at the time of trial that they are experiencing a deficit. See Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (noting that the "test must be whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult" (emphasis added)); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 171 (1975) (noting that the mentally incompetent defendant cannot be tried
because he is, in effect, "afforded no opportunity to defend himself"). Acquittal by
reason of insanity, however, clearly excuses the defendant where a deficit occurs at
the time of committing the crime. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86 (1985) (after
raising insanity defense, psychiatric evaluation would be undertaken to determine
"petitioner's mental state at the time of the offense" (emphasis added)).
9 This is the incompetence standard in Wisconsin. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
6 The focus here is on the cognitive prong of Wisconsin's insanity defense. See
supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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and appreciation of what he or she is doing but becomes
incompetent prior to trial cannot be committed as an SVP.
Meanwhile, the individual who does not know or appreciate what
he or she is doing at the time of the offense but is competent to
stand trial can be so committed. This confusion is compounded
by the fact that Wisconsin allows SVP commitment of individuals
who are convicted of sexually violent offenses and have
completed their sentences, even if the individual is incompetent
at the time of the SVP commitment hearing.9 7
But in Virginia, the opposite situation exists. Those found
not guilty by reason of insanity are not eligible for SVP
commitment, while those found incompetent to stand trial are.9
So in Virginia, the individual who does not know the nature and
quality of his or her action-or does not know the action is
wrong 0 -when the individual is committing a sexually violent
offense, a rape 1' for example, is not eligible for commitment as
an SVP. The individual who commits the rape fully
understanding his or her actions but who does not understand
the resulting criminal charges or who is unable to assist counsel
at trial is eligible for SVP commitment.'02
11 See In re Commitment of Luttrell, 754 N.W.2d 249, 252-53 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that sex offender does not have a due process right to a competency
hearing prior to an SVP commitment hearing).
98 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(A) (2009) ("[Ihf the court finds that the
defendant is incompetent and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future and
the defendant has been charged with a sexually violent offense, as defined in § 37.2-
900, he shall be reviewed for commitment pursuant to Chapter 9 (§ 37.2-900 et seq.)
of Title 37.2.").
9 See id. § 19.2-169.1 (defining competency as a determination that the
defendant "lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or
to assist his attorney in his own defense").
'0 Virginia recognizes two tests for insanity, the first being the M'Naghten test
for insanity. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899, 902 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
Under this test,
it must be clearly prove[n] that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Price v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 106, 109 (Va. 1984) (citations and quotations
omitted).
101 See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2009); § 18.2-61 (2006).
102 See id. § 37.2-900.
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Even more bizarre, in addition to applying the M'Naghten
test 03 for the insanity defense, Virginia allows the irresistible
impulse test." A defendant seeking an insanity acquittal based
on this test must show that the individual's "mind has become so
impaired by disease that he is totally deprived of the mental
power to control or restrain his act."' This undoubtedly creates
a situation in which those defendants who show difficulty in
controlling their behavior, such that they are likely to engage in
dangerous sexual behavior in the future, should be found not
guilty by reason of insanity of the sex crime charged. And, as a
result of Virginia's current framework, these individuals-
arguably the most "deserving" of SVP branding-would be wholly
exempt from SVP commitment because Virginia's SVP statute
does not reach insanity acquittees. 106
The two states' findings-determining eligibility based upon
the timing of the break-are curious conclusions. Both states fail
to provide any evidence in the introductory or legislative
statement sections of their SVP statutes that one of the groups is
inherently more dangerous than the other in order to justify the
differential treatment. Without evidence to the contrary, the
timing of the individual's rationality deficit seems serendipitous,
not dangerousness-determinative. This key difference between
the SVP statutes in Wisconsin and Virginia indicates a lack of
clarity and consensus, which makes defending either state's
decision difficult.
Nevertheless, Wisconsin's triggering distinction-allowing
those acquitted by reason of insanity to qualify for SVP
commitment while excluding those found incompetent to stand
trial-could be arguably supported by Supreme Court
103 The M'Naghten test has been adopted by a "majority of jurisdictions" in the
United States. In re Manuel L., 865 P.2d 718, 726 (Cal. 1994). It provides an
insanity defense when "the defendant is unable to understand the nature and
quality of his act or unable to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to it
that he cannot be held responsible." State v. Myers, 290 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Neb. 1980)
(Krivosha, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see Nolan v. State, 61 So. 3d 887, 895
(Miss. 2011) (defining the test as requiring a defendant to be "laboring under such
defect of reason from disease of the mind as (1) not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing or (2) if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was
doing was wrong." (citations omitted)).
1' See Morgan, 646 S.E.2d at 902.
105 See id. (quotation marks omitted).
10 See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900.
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jurisprudence.' Those incompetent to stand trial have not yet
been convicted of any sexually violent offense, while those who
have been judged not guilty by reason of insanity-while
technically not a conviction-have been judged to have met all
the prima facie elements of a crime but are not subject to
criminal punishment because of a defect of reason'08 or an
inability to control one's actions'09 at the time of its commission.
But whether the Supreme Court has found that those acquitted
by reason of insanity are dangerous"0 or not, it still does not
explain why that group of individuals-and not those found
incompetent to stand trial-is eligible for Wisconsin's SVP
statute. This is especially true given the explicit requirement
that the state must find-as a separate, standalone requirement
from the triggering behavior requirement-that the individual
has difficulty in controlling his or her behavior such that he or
she is likely to be dangerous in the future."'
C. California and Congress: Currently Incarcerated
In California, in order to trigger the SVP commitment
statute, the individual must be "in custody under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" at the time
commitment is sought." 2 This means that in California, "[a]
petition may be filed ... if the individual was in custody
pursuant to his or her determinate prison term, parole revocation
term, or a hold placed pursuant to Section 6601.3."I's Individuals
who have committed multiple sexually violent crimes, but who
are not currently in custody, are not covered by the statute. In
2008, the Supreme Court of California specifically addressed its
1' See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983) (holding not guilty by
reason of insanity verdict can automatically result in civil commitment, finding of
dangerousness, and mental illness can be assumed); see also Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 76-78 (1992) (finding that an individual found not guilty by reason of
insanity, who has overcome mental illness, must be released).
108 Both Wisconsin and Virginia recognize the insanity defense based upon a
cognitive deficit. See supra text accompanying notes 88, 100.
109 Virginia recognizes the irresistible impulse test as part of its insanity
standard. See supra text accompanying note 100.
10 See supra text accompanying note 107.
"I WIs. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2011).
112 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a)(1) (West 2012).
113 Id. § 6601 (a)(2). Section 6601.3 provides that the individual can be held after
being referred to the State Department of Mental Health "for no more than 45 days
beyond the person's scheduled release date for full evaluation." § 6601.3(a).
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state's limitation on SVP commitment.114  Concluding that
California's incarceration or non-incarceration triggering
distinction was rational for purposes of the equal protection
clause, the court noted:
[Tihe Legislature could legitimately conclude in the context of
the SVP Act that any felonious criminal conduct would warrant
a finding of greater danger and a separate classification.
Individuals in prison with felony convictions have yet to
demonstrate their capacity or willingness to keep their conduct
within the bounds of the law and to break old criminal habits,
and the Legislature could legitimately conclude that such felons
who have prior sexually violent offenses represent a particular
danger to society that justifies a separate system of civil
commitment. 115
Notwithstanding the court's decision, California's triggering
distinction remains dubious. Not only does the state insert an
unnecessary distinction between two especially similarly-situated
groups, but an argument could be made that the statute seeks to
detain the wrong group of the two. Would it not make more
sense for California to detain-or at least scrutinize more
closely-those individuals who are living in society now? Couple
this with California's well-documented problem of overcrowding
in prisons and recent mandatory prison cuts," 6 and one is left to
wonder if current inmates are the most deserving of SVP
commitment.
Mirroring California, the same limitation exists to narrow
those subject to federal commitment under the Adam Walsh Act.
Under the Act, Congress has authorized commitment for those
deemed "sexually dangerous,""' but only if they have: (1) been
114 In re Smith, 178 P.3d 446, 447-48 (Cal. 2008).
" Id. at 483.
n1 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (holding California's
prisoner overcrowding violated Eighth Amendment and ordering prison population
reductions); see also Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner
Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, http//www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24
scotus.html?pagewanted=all (noting that California must reduce its prison
population from over 140,000 to 110,000 in two years).
n1 A sexually dangerous person is a "person who has engaged or attempted to
engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is sexually
dangerous to others." 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2012). "Sexually dangerous to others" is
further defined to mean "that the person suffers from a serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." Id.
§ 4247(a)(6).
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convicted and are in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,
(2) been found incompetent and are committed to the custody of
the Attorney General, or (3) had all criminal charges against
them dismissed "solely for reasons relating to the mental
condition of the person."18 This "location" distinction has become
the determinative factor in recent federal litigation, with a
federal court holding that the application of the Adam Walsh Act
to only those currently incarcerated, and not to others who could
be dangerous, violated equal protection.119
III. QUARANTINE: AN ANALOGOUS PREVENTIVE DETENTION
States are allowed to preventively detain their citizens' 2 0 or
require protective action' 2 1-in the name of public safety. In
Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court noted that states have
the right to forcibly detain those who "pose a danger to the public
health and safety." 122 To demonstrate this point, Justice Thomas
used the analogue of compulsory quarantine and isolation law-
the right of states to detain those believed exposed to, or
diagnosed with, contagious diseases-to show that a state can
involuntarily confine those without demonstrating a punitive
purpose.1 23 By invoking the law of quarantine, Justice Thomas
invites a review of SVP statutes and their disparate triggering
behavior requirements. This Part takes up the invitation for
such a PHR.
u1 Id. § 4248(a).
119 This decision was subsequently vacated. See supra text accompanying note
60.
120 See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S.
270, 275-76 (1940) (upholding state power to commit those with psychopathic
personalities who are unable to control their sexual impulses).
121 See Jacobson v. Massachussets, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (upholding state's
requirement that citizens receive smallpox vaccination).
122 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) ("Accordingly, States have in certain narrow
circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to
control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and
safety .... It thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited
subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.").
123 See id. at 366. Justice Thomas cites to Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. La. Bd. Of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902), which upholds a quarantine order
of a French ship as a constitutional exercise of state public health power.
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Methodologically, this PHR is apt because focus has returned
to the ethics and regulation of quarantine. 2 4 In the wake of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act 2 5 and the Turning Point Model State Public
Health Act 26 were published. Both documents attempt to
provide guidance for future quarantine situations.'2 7 Further,
following the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS")
outbreak in Toronto in 2003, bioethicists developed ten values to
govern future quarantine implementations, including a wide
range of protections and principles. 2 s
Through these and other sources, public health thinkers
have developed ethical considerations that serve to guide the
emergency regime of quarantine going forward. And from
compulsory vaccination of health care workers in the wake of the
supposed smallpox threat in 2005,129 to the first compulsory
quarantine ordered by the CDC in nearly forty years, to Atlanta
attorney Andrew Speaker in 2007,130 real-life public health
124 The law of quarantine has been the subject of renewed interest in the United
States, especially following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the SARS outbreak
in 2003. See David Claborn & Bernard McCarthy, Incarceration and Isolation of the
Innocent for Reasons of Public Health, 11 J. INST. JUST. & INT'L STUD. 75, 83 (2011)
(describing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as "[prompting] the federal
government to assess its vulnerabilities in a number of areas, including the threat
posed by infectious diseases," and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome ("SARS") as "[aiccelerating the policy interests in this area"). These
events led to the development of the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security,
the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, a national strategy for pandemic
influenza, and statutory remedies to ease the implementation of potential
quarantines. Id.
125 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl. (Ctrs. L. & Pub.
Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins U. 2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA], available
at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.
126 TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT art. IV (Turning Point Pub.
Health Statute Modernization Collaborative 2003) [hereinafter TURNING POINT],
available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/improving/turningpoint/PDFs/MSPHA
web.pdf.
127 See MSEHPA § 101; TURNING POINT § 5-108.
121 See Peter A. Singer et al., Ethics and SARS: Lessons from Toronto, 327 BRIT.
MED. J. 1342, 1342 (2003).
1" See Thomas May et al., The Smallpox Vaccination of Health Care Workers:
Professional Obligations and Defense Against Bioterrorism, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 26 (arguing that health care workers did not have a professional
or ethical obligation to expose themselves to a smallpox vaccination as mandated by
President George W. Bush's smallpox policy to vaccinate approximately 500,000
health care workers in the name of bioterrorism defense).
130 See Gregory P. Campbell, Comment, The Global H1N1 Pandemic,
Quarantine Law, and the Due Process Conflict, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 497, 511
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events continue to provide case studies ripe for discussion. To
complete an application of quarantine principles to SVP statutes'
distinct triggering behavior requirements, this Part will first
show why the analogy between the two civil structures is
appropriate.
There are many different conditions that can justify "long
term preventive detention,"1 31 but the preventive detentions that
quarantine individuals and commit SVPs are particularly
similar.132  Reflecting the same legislative intent seen in SVP
statutes, quarantines incapacitate potentially dangerous
individuals with the paramount goal of preventing harm to the
community. Both schemes require an abnormality-one
physiological, one behavioral-and both seek to detain
individuals regardless of whether they are blameworthy-that is,
they are "non-punitive."' 3 Quarantine and SVP commitment
also allow for incapacitation for as long as the threat continues.
Both may offer treatment, if such is available. Both also rely
(2011) (presenting the quarantine saga of Andrew Speaker, an attorney from
Atlanta, who in March 2007, contracted drug-resistant tuberculosis and ignored a
warning from public health officials not to travel, instead attending his wedding in
Greece and honeymoon in Italy). After Speaker was found in Italy, the CDC
"informed him that he could not return to the United States and should be
quarantined immediately." Id. But Speaker ignored the directive, flew to North
America, and rented a car to return to the United States. Id. at 511-12. His story
generated attention revolving around the proper response to a quarantine order.
1a1 See Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status
as a Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1236-37 (2011)
(listing eleven different conditions "in which people can sometimes justifiably be
preventively detained," including "being a material witness for a trial," "being a
prisoner of war," and "having the intention to inflict serious harm upon oneself").
132 Cf. George Annas, Control of Tuberculosis: The Law and the Public's Health,
328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 586 (1993) ("The closest legal analogy [to medically-
related commitment] is provided by court cases that have reviewed the
constitutionality of state statutes permitting the involuntary commitment of mental
patients on the basis that they have a disease that causes them to be dangerous.").
133 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) ("This is a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded.");
Corrado, supra note 85, at 812 ("The similarity between preventive detention and
quarantine is that in both cases we confine people on the basis of dangerousness in
the absence of fault."); Wendy E. Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives: The Perils of
Individualizing Public Health Problems, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 83, 93 (2009) (In public
health emergencies, "[tihe perception that someone's disease creates a great risk to
others, however, does not logically imply that he or she should be viewed as morally
culpable."). Some, however, may quibble with this characterization of SVPs as
lacking moral culpability-an argument that has been echoed in the public health
realm. See id. ("[Allmost invariably our culture tends to perceive so-called dangerous
patients as not only epidemiologically but morally responsible for disease.").
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upon a prediction of forward-looking behavior: In the quarantine
context, public health officials must make decisions while
cognizant of the future likelihood of a devastating outbreak,
whereas, in the SVP context, state officials must decide who
should be detained based upon a level of risk of sexual
misconduct. Above all, both seek to maneuver the often
uncomfortable tension between personal liberty and preventing
societal harm.
However, it must be recognized that the analogy between the
quarantine and SVP frameworks is not flawless. Most salient is
the difference in the specific means of causing harm: In order for
the individual with a communicable disease to expose society to
risk, no intent is required to complete the risky act, 134 nor,
generally, is any further conduct required at all.'35 Indeed, all
the contagious individual has to do is walk down the street-
depending, of course, on the mode of transmission of the
infectious agent. 136 Conversely, in the SVP context, individuals
have to act to bring about the harm. 1 3  As a result, different from
the infected individual, the SVP does not immediately constitute
an imminent public threat.'3 8
Related to this point, the outward markers of dangerousness
in the two regimes are vastly different. In the SVP context, it is
difficult to determine just who may be the most likely to commit
a future act, whereas in quarantine, public health officials can
rely upon the manifestation of physical symptoms as indicators of
an individual's potential dangerousness. Although some have
argued that this fact of SVP commitment-along with the degree
134 See Walen, supra note 131, at 1259-60.
13 See CHRIS SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 120 (2006).
136 Id.
13' See Walen, supra note 131, at 1259 (noting that the analogy between "people
like Hendricks" and quarantine detention "would be fitting if (1) they really could
not avoid acting on their urge to molest children when they got it, and (2) they could
not tell when the urge was coming on so as to put themselves in a position where
others could prevent them from acting on it"). Walen argues that where SVPs can
sense the urge rising and can resist it for long enough to get out of an enticing
situation, the quarantine analogy breaks down. Id. at 1260. But for the purpose
here, building a better SVP framework, the degree to which the individual SVP can
or cannot control him or herself in preventing harm does not make the principles
that govern quarantine inapplicable.
1' See SLOBOGIN, supra note 135.
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and type of harm the SVP would cause if released-provides
special moral cover to SVP detention schemes,3 9 it does not
lessen the importance of having defensible entrance criteria.
A second difference focuses on the amount of liberty
deprivation each detention scheme authorizes. Quarantines are
typically short, 40 temporarily depriving individuals of liberty and
quickly restoring it when the public health emergency subsides.
The adverse is true for SVP statutes: Incentives could lead to a
longer, potentially lifelong SVP commitment.' 4' Based upon this
difference, it would appear that the SVP context is deserving of
stricter, time-tested principles more protective of individual
liberties.
Finally, a third difference exists concerning the number of
individuals likely subjected to the two different detention
schemes. As currently configured, few Americans can be
subjected to SVP commitment.142 Conversely, mass quarantines
can sweep large numbers of individuals into confinement during
public health emergencies.143  This difference highlights the
importance of principled rules for quarantine-with the potential
that many citizens could be impacted. Nevertheless, it does not
provide a reason for why these principles should not also apply to
SVP detention as well.
139 See, e.g., Alexander Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SoUND L. REV. 709, 753 (1992)
("A mistaken decision to confine, however painful to the offender involved, is, in my
view, simply not morally equivalent to a mistaken decision to release. There is a
significant difference between the two. One is much less harmful than the other.").
140 See Alec Walen, A Unified Theory ofDetention, with Application to Preventive
Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 921 (2011) ("[Q]uarantines
involve a short-term deprivation of liberty.").
141 See Winick, supra note 70, at 543-44.
142 See Comparison, supra note 64.
14 During the 2003 SARS outbreaks, Toronto quarantined 30,000 people,
Beijing quarantined about 30,000, and about 131,000 were quarantined in Taiwan.
See Martin Cetron & Pattie Simone, Battling 21st-Century Scourges with a 14th-
Century Toolbox, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES J. 2053, 2053 (2004), available
at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/content/10/11/pdfs/vlO-nl1.pdf.
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IV. TOWARD A MORE CIVIL DETENTION: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
Both types of preventive commitment analyzed here rely on
a health-related marker'"-mental abnormality or contagious
disease-as well as a likelihood of dangerousness. 45  However,
SVP statutes diverge from the reasoned approach of public
health quarantine: SVP statutes require a third showing-some
sort of triggering behavior-before allowing commitment.146 This
showing becomes puzzling when one examines the overwhelming
reason why legislatures established this framework: preventing
future societal harm.
Generally, a number of ethical values governing quarantine
could be employed for this PHR. Those include: (1) reciprocity,
which seeks to prevent economic penalties and to ensure
adequate care for those affected;' 47 (2) solidarity, which "calls for
collaborative approaches that set aside traditional values of self-
interest or territoriality among health care professionals,
services, or institutions";148 and (3) trust, which constitutes "an
essential component of the relationships" between those health
care providers and officials and the subjects of a quarantine. 4 1
But the ethical values do not necessarily speak to whether the
different triggers in the SVP framework are justifiable. As a
result, I will apply a subset of principles that typically apply to
quarantine implementation-both in the United States and
internationally-and are particularly applicable to SVP
detention.
1" Some would disagree that "mental abnormality" has anything to do with
mental illness diagnosis. See Morse, supra note 42.
"I See, e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1993) (noting quarantine cannot be based upon "illness alone," but that "a court
must find that the risk of infliction of serious bodily injury upon another is probable
in the reasonably foreseeable future").
141 See id.
14 See UNIV. TORONTO JOINT CTR. FOR BIOETHICS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
WORKING GRP., STAND ON GUARD FOR THEE: ETHIcAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
PREPAREDNESS PLANNING FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 13 (2005), [hereinafter STAND
ON GUARD], available at http://www.jointcentreforbioethics.ca/people/documents/up
shur-stand-guard.pdf.
"4 Id. at 7.
149 Id. at 7-8.
876 [Vol. 87:847
2013] SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES
Four interrelated principles govern quarantine
implementation and help to illuminate this PHR,'10 and all four
demonstrate the inadequacies of the current SVP regimes' trigger
requirements. The first, necessity, focuses on whether a
sufficiently high level of risk exists, limiting quarantines to only
the most serious public health threats.'8 ' The second,
proportionality, ensures that a state's response is evenhanded in
application.'52 The third principle, verifiability, asks whether the
detention scheme has a science-based, defensible standard for
determining who should be eligible for commitment. 5 s Finally,
fairness examines whether the system equally distributes
burdens and benefits between those similarly-situated.' 4  An
introduction and application of each to the SVP framework
follows.
A. Necessity
In her piece, J.S. Mill and the American Law of
Quarantine,'5 Professor Wendy Parmet lays out the often
minimal requirements American courts impose on quarantine
schemes; the most important for the instant analysis is the
requirement of necessity. Quarantines must be necessary-that
is, the public health emergency must be sufficiently serious to
justify state intervention. 5 6 As Parmet says, "the restriction of
"o See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A READER 147 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed.,
2010) (recognizing, from Jacobson v. Massachusetts, four constitutional standards
for a compulsory public health act: necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and
harm avoidance); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health:
How Far Are Limitations on Human Rights Justified, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 524,
526 (2003) ("[Offering] four familiar principles as a basis for the appropriate exercise
of public health powers, consistent with human rights norms: necessity, effective
means, proportionality, and fairness.").
"' See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 150.
152 Id.
1 Id.
* Id.
s" See generally Wendy E. Parmet, J.S. Mill and the American Law of
Quarantine, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 210 (2008) (arguing, ultimately, that America's
modern quarantine law does not sufficiently track John Stuart Mill's harm
principle).
15 See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & David P. Fidler, Biosecurity Under the Rule
of Law, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 437, 461-62 (2007) (noting that "isolation and
quarantine may only be used pursuant to a court order based on evidence that the
intervention will prevent transmission of an infectious disease [and] is necessary to
protect the community's health .... By requiring justificatory evidence at every
step, the rule of law ensures that government will have the power to protect the
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an individual's bodily liberty in the name of public health is
legitimate only when it is necessary for and capable of preventing
the spread of disease.""' Courts,158 legislatures,'59 and scholars 60
recognize the fact that quarantine must be "absolutely
necessary"16 to be ethically and legally employed. If a public
health threat does not require quarantine to protect the public's
health, it must be avoided.
Within this context, an analysis of the necessity of the SVP
superstructure can split one of two ways. First, on a general
level, there is no denying that for some individuals like Gary
Minnix and Leroy Hendricks, SVP detention is necessary to keep
them from committing harm.16 2 However, for the rest subject to
this detention, data do not conclusively support the proposition
community's health, but that this power is used only where necessary to reduce a
serious health threat.").
I Parmet, supra note 155, at 213 (emphasis added); see also Gostin & Fidler,
supra note 156, at 461 ("Abrogation of individual rights and liberties can only be
justified if the intervention is necessary and effective to achieve an important
objective.").
158 See, e.g., Carrie Lacey, Abuse of Quarantine Authority: The Case for a
Federal Approach to Infectious Disease Containment, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 199, 209
(2003) (citing City of N.Y. v. Antoinette R, 165 Misc. 2d 1014, 1019-20, 630
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1011 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1995); City of New York v. Doe, 205
A.D.2d 469, 470, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8, 8 (1st Dep't 1994)) ("The public health official must
show quarantine is necessary. . . ."); see also Kathleen C. Chen, Pennsylvania's
Bioterrorism Act: Better Prevention from Better Preparation, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 165, 180 (2005) (citations omitted) ("The government must demonstrate
that the quarantine is necessary to serve a compelling purpose, and that any official
acts will serve that compelling government purpose.").
159 See Gostin & Fidler, supra note 156, at 461-62.
'6 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 12,
21 (2003) (noting that "[elarly detection could save many lives by triggering an
effective containment strategy such as vaccination, treatment and, if necessary,
isolation or quarantine" and that "individuals who refused to comply with public
health orders would, if necessary to protect the public's health, be subject to isolation
or quarantine" (emphasis added)).
161 John D. Blum & Norchaya Talib, Balancing Individual Rights Versus
Collective Good in Public Health Enforcement, 25 MED. & L. 273, 277 (2006) ("A
noted group of legal scholars and ethicists have developed several guiding principles
to underpin laws concerning quarantine and isolation .. . abiding by the rule of law
and application of such measures only when absolutely necessary." (emphasis
added)).
162 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997) ("Hendricks admitted that
he had repeatedly abused children whenever he was not confined . .. Although
Hendricks recognized that his behavior harms children, and he hoped he would not
sexually molest children again, he stated that the only sure way he could keep from
sexually abusing children in the future was 'to die.' ").
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that sexual offenders are particularly more likely to recidivate
than other offenders.163 This is compounded by the fact that,
statistically, a large chunk of America's citizens are not likely to
be victims of sexually violent crime in their lifetimes.'" Putting
aside the most imminently dangerous individuals, these two facts
provide clear challenges to a finding that these statutes are
necessary to prevent substantial societal harm'6 under a PHR.
Nevertheless, the fact that twenty states166 have now
implemented an SVP statute indicates that, over the last twenty-
four years, an increasing number of states have found the
problem of sexually violent crimes to be such a threat as to
require a state response. It also indicates that most states have
either reached the opposite conclusion or have simply not
recognized the harm. No matter the reason, the fact that the
majority of states have not implemented SVP statutes
nationwide indicates that the risk level presented by SVPs may
not be deserving of a "crisis" status in those states, and that its
"solution" may not be called "necessary."
Second, one can also examine the necessity of the triggering
mechanisms' distinctions. As the balance of this Article
illustrates, even those states that do have SVP regimes cannot
agree on the same entrance criteria. The heterogeneity among
states that have passed SVP statutes further indicates a lack of
emergency-or at least confused thinking about the nature of the
danger. States that have implemented SVP statutes cannot
agree upon entrance criteria, showing that there is no clear
definition of what the harm is or who is responsible for it. If
there was a clear definition, the entrance criteria governing SVP
commitment would likely be more uniform. Among the states
with SVP statutes, no justification is provided as to why certain
groups are wholly exempted from the reach of detention.
1" See Levenson, supra note 69, at 6.
'6 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, in 2009, 0.5 per 1000 people
were victims of rape or sexual assault. See Jennifer L. Truman & Michael R. Rand,
National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal Victimization, 2009, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf.
165 See LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
60-61 (2008) (presenting the difference between lay and expert perceptions of risk
and noting that "[the public's perception of risk is influenced by its salience. The
more media draws attention to statistically low risks, the more the public becomes
concerned.").
'6 See supra text accompanying note 8.
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A traditional public health example provides a worthwhile
hypothetical. Fearing an outbreak of a particularly virulent new
sexually transmitted disease, and after noticing a handful of
citizens exhibiting symptoms, one state quarantines those who
engage in risky sexual behavior, defined as having unprotected
sexual relations with more than twenty-five people over the last
four years. During the same timeframe, another state commits
those who have engaged in risky sexual behavior, using the same
definition, but only those who live near, within two miles of, a
red-light district-defined as housing a certain number of escorts
per square mile. Another state implements a detention regime,
but seeks to detain only those who have had certain sexually
transmitted diseases in the past. Three more states implement
no quarantine.
In this scenario, could a state conclude that the virulent, new
sexually transmitted disease strain is a public health emergency
necessitating an overarching framework to catch and detain
those who may pose the most risk? How can one state declare a
public health emergency requiring potentially lifelong
commitment and defend that scheme by characterizing it as
addressing a public health emergency, when that state's neighbor
across the river not only chooses against building a similar
commitment framework, but also does not even recognize that a
public health emergency exists?
This is the current situation created by the states' divergent
triggering requirements. Because of these distinctions, the exact
parameters of the "public health emergency" are not congruent
from state to state. Indeed, the failure of states to
homogeneously identify who is the cause of the unacceptable
societal risk presents problems for the necessity analysis. Within
those states that have determined that a public safety emergency
exists, and whose legislatures have established an SVP
framework, there are major inconsistencies, as shown above.
Can New Jersey argue that a public safety emergency exists,
necessitating the construction of an SVP framework, to respond
to a risk created solely by those convicted of sexually violent
offenses, and not, say, by individuals who have committed
sexually violent acts but never been convicted? Can California
defend the argument that those living within its own prisons-an
odd boundary itself-are responsible for its public safety
880 [Vol. 87:847
2013] SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES
emergency? Because of the lack of uniformity in this area, it is
difficult to argue that the threat from SVPs is a sufficient public
emergency such that detention is "absolutely necessary."
B. Proportionality and the Least Restrictive Alternative
If necessity demands that the risk be sufficient to justify
intervention, proportionality ensures a reasoned intervention.
Proportionality requires that quarantines be "limited to the
actual level of risk to community"1'6 and have their
"benefits ... balanced against the negative features and
effects."6 s Another way courts169 and the model acts refer to
proportionality is by way of the "least restrictive alternative"
doctrine.'70 This serves to limit state interventions to "require
the least invasive intervention that will achieve the objective.""'
Indeed, specifically in the quarantine context, courts have
applied a least restrictive alternative analysis, requiring the
state to demonstrate that the confinement is proportional in light
of the risk presented.'7 2 This could include an analysis of "the
place of confinement as well as the fact of confinement."'
167 Martin Cetron & Julius Landwirth, Public Health and Ethical
Considerations in Planning for Quarantine, 78 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 325, 329
(2005) (citing Stand on Guard, supra note 147).
16 See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHIcS, supra note 150, at 72.
169 Parmet, supra note 155, at 213 ("[Clourts and commentators have used the
constitutional law phrase 'least restrictive alternative' to express the idea .. . that
quarantine is justified only when there is no other intervention available to prevent
the spread of disease that would be less restrictive of liberty.").
170 See, e.g., TURNING POINT, supra note 126, § 5-108(b)(1) ("Isolation and
quarantine must be by the least restrictive means necessary to prevent the spread of
a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others. . . ."); MSEHPA, supra note
125, § 604(b)(1) (using the same language as the TURNING POINT Model Act).
171 Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe Infectious
Disease Threats, 290 JAMA 3229, 3232 (2003).
172 See City of New York v. Antoinette R., 165 Misc. 2d. 1014, 1015-18, 630
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009-11 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1995) (noting that for quarantine of
someone with active tuberculosis, the state statute requires "an appraisal of the risk
posed to others and a review of less restrictive alternatives which were attempted or
considered"); City of New York v. Doe, 205 A.D.2d 469, 470, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st
Dep't 1994) (ordering detention where respondent was unable to comply with
medication under less restrictive alternatives); City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265
278 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (upholding quarantine where patient presented
risk to others and hospital confinement was least restrictive mode presented).
173 In re Washington, 735 N.W.2d 111, 125 (Wis. 2007) (examining detention
order of individual with tuberculosis and reviewing Wisconsin quarantine statute,
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As Lawrence Gostin argues, public health officials should
consider the invasiveness, frequency and scope, and duration of
the detention in order to determine whether the intrusion
constitutes the least restrictive alternative.14  In this analysis,
the invasiveness and duration of detention for many SVPs is
particularly restrictive. For those institutionalized, liberty is
restricted; the ability to work, socialize, and move freely is
strictly inhibited. The duration of the detention, as
aforementioned, can be lifelong. 7 1
Further, state officials must make a risk assessment on "a
case-by-case basis" where "[i]ndividualized risk assessments" are
made, "avoid[ing] decisions made under a blanket rule or
generalization about a class of persons."7 6 Wholly excluding
large groups of citizens from SVP statutes' reach, while
automatically subjecting others, does not provide a case-by-case
risk assessment. To be sure, others would argue that the risk
analysis is encapsulated in the "likely to be dangerous" prong of
SVP commitment, but an individual could be found "likely to be
dangerous" and yet still be excluded from SVP commitment if he
or she fails to meet one of the triggering requirements.
The sexually transmitted disease hypothetical mentioned
above provides additional guidance here. Imagine that, even
though individuals have a 0.05% annual chance of contracting
the contagious sexually transmitted disease,' 7 fear of the new
sexually transmitted disease leads one state to detain those who
engage in risky sexual behavior, using the same definition as
presented above. A different state detains those who have
engaged in risky sexual behavior but only those who live near a
red-light district, a third state detains those who have had a
certain sexually transmitted disease in the past, and three other
states implement no detention scheme. Imagine also that
because the sexually transmitted disease's incubation period is
ultimately concluding that committing the individual in a jail was not an abuse of
discretion).
174 GOSTIN, supra note 165, at 68.
1' See supra text accompanying note 63-65.
176 GOSTIN, supra note 165, at 57; see also City of Newark, 652 A.2d at 274 ("The
best way to guard against such risk is to demand an individualized, fact-specific
determination as to the person under consideration.").
.. See Truman & Rand, supra note 164.
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two years, the states that impose commitment do so for two
years. During these two years, all individuals falling under the
statutes' ambit are held in a prison. 178
This hypothetical scheme would most easily be attacked
because of its lack of proportionality. Putting aside the fact that
the states exempt different individuals from the quarantine-and
some states do not even order any quarantine-the length of time
and conditions that individuals are subject to would likely be
decried, especially in light of the low risk of transmission the
disease presents. Most importantly, both the detention type and
length under SVP statutes are bluntly applied, without
consulting potential alternatives to lifelong, coercive detention
for each individual within the statute's reach. This lack of
proportionality would be further exacerbated by the inconsistent
application of standards among states. If this type of detention
would lack proportionality sufficient for quarantine, it also lacks
it for SVP detention under a PHR.
C. Verifiability
Before a particular quarantine will be upheld, it must be
shown to be scientifically effective and verifiable. To "guard
against the risk that governmental action may be grounded in
popular myths, irrational fears, or noxious fallacies rather than
well-founded science," public health authorities' decisions "must
be based upon the latest knowledge of epidemiology, virology,
bacteriology, and public health.""' As an initial matter, the
criteria used by many states to determine who is likely to be
dangerous in the future have recently been cast in tremendous
" In New Jersey, SVP detainees were held in county correctional facilities from
2001 to 2009. See Jerry McCrea, N.J. Appeals Court Orders State To Move Sexually
Violent Predators from Hudson Facility, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 18, 2009,
http-J/www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/nj-appeals-courtorders-state.html;
Sharon Adarlo, Avenel Waiting for 'Temporary' Prison to Close," NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, May 18, 2009, http1/blog.nj.com/ledgerarchives/2007/07/avenel-waiting
foritemporary p.html. In South Carolina, SVPs have been housed in a South
Carolina Department of Corrections unit formerly used to house Death Row
inmates. See Brundrett, supra note 10.
Conversely, jails and prisons are categorically inappropriate for quarantine. See
Gostin et al., supra note 171, at 3234 ("Since isolation and quarantine are designed
to promote well-being and not to punish the individual, public health authorities
have the obligation to provide quarters that are decent and not degrading. Jails and
prisons are unacceptable settings for confinement.").
179 City of Newark, 652 A.2d at 274.
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doubt.' Putting aside the striking issue of whether current
procedures are good enough at predicting which individuals are
likely to be dangerous, the key determination in the instant
analysis is whether the distinct triggers, and the differential
treatment of whole groups of individuals resulting in coercive
detention, can be scientifically defended and verified.'8 '
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act mentions
this tenet in its preamble and legislative findings sections:
"Emergency powers must be grounded in a thorough scientific
understanding of public health threats and disease
transmission."'8 2 The Turning Point agrees: "Whenever possible,
a state or local public health agency shall exercise its authorities
or powers through procedures, practices, or programs that are
based on modem, scientifically-sound principles and evidence."' 3
Basing a public health quarantine on sound science is not a
controversial concept; the American Medical Association has
noted that "[tihe medical profession . .. must take an active role
in ensuring that those interventions are based on science."'8
'8 See Frederick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders,
44 CONN. L. REV. 161, 166 (2011) (arguing that since we cannot predict future
dangerousness-and the current criteria used to determine who should be
committed as SVPs under the Static-99 test is imprecise and error-prone-that
standards should be improved, existing standards should be lowered, or SVP
commitment should be abandoned).
181 See Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health
Emergencies: Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 409 (2003) ("Once again, when
implementing measures as coercive as quarantine, it is important that the criteria
for determining to whom it applies must be based on scientific facts.").
182 MSEHPA, supra note 125, pmbl.
183 TURNING POINT, supra note 126, § 5-101(b)(2).
184 AM. MED. ASS'N CODE OF MED. ETHICS, OPINION 2.25: THE USE OF
QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS (2006), available at
http/www.ama-assn.orgama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion225.page.
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Other entities, from state supreme courts1s5 to Department of
Health and Human Services' agency statements, 186 rely on this
requirement in the context of quarantine.
In the courts, the requirement of scientific soundness is
perhaps best illustrated by a seminal quarantine case heard by
the Northern District of California over 100 years ago.18' Less
than three weeks after it had enjoined enforcement of a
resolution passed by the San Francisco board of health requiring
any "Chinese or Asiatic person" who attempted to leave the city
to be inoculated against the bubonic plague,'88 the court heard
Jew Ho v. Williamson,189 which involved the same discrimination
against those of Chinese descent in San Francisco. As a response
to the previous court decision, 90 the city board of health had
established a quarantine of a twelve-block area where those of
Chinese descent lived-the "Chinese Quarter"' 91-after reports of
nine deaths due to bubonic plague. 9 2 Jew Ho, a grocer,
challenged the resolution, arguing that the quarantine was
enforced only against those of Chinese descent and not against
185 See State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court for King Cnty., 174 P. 973, 978-
79 (Wash. 1918) (noting that "inasmuch as the whole matter of quarantine must rest
ultimately in the judgment of medical men, it could avoid the danger of partisan
opinion and fix the seat of that judgment in men of its own choosing, or to be chosen
in a way provided, and who being bound by oath to perform a public duty, and
having a due sense of responsibility presumably would discharge their office with
justice and fidelity").
186 Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892-01, 71,895, 2005 WL
3171577 (Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 CFR pts. 70 & 71) ("The quarantine
officer's reasonable belief would be informed by objective scientific evidence such as
clinical criteria indicative of one of the specified quarantinable diseases . . . .
Provisionally quarantined individuals are provided with a written order in support
of the agency's determination at the time that provisional quarantine commences or
as soon thereafter as the circumstances reasonably permit.").
187 See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D Cal. 1900).
188 See Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1900). Holding it a
'wrongful and oppressive interference with their personal liberty" and a violation of
equal protection of the laws, the court enjoined enforcement of the resolution, noting
that measures of this sort that "have ] a uniform operation" and are "reasonably
adapted to the purpose of protecting the health and preserving the welfare of the
inhabitants of a city" easily pass constitutional muster, but that applying the
regulation only to those of Chinese dissent in the city was unreasonably
discriminatory, causing "great and irreparable loss and injury." Id. at 3-6.
189 103 F. 10.
11 See Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic
Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 70-71 (1985).
191 Wong Wai, 103 F. at 6.
192 Jew Ho, 103 F. at 11-13.
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citizens of other races living within the quarantined district. 9 3
Further, he argued, city officials did not quarantine the houses
where purported plague victims lived,194 nor did they restrict
intercommunication within the district,15 which allowed for the
easy spread of germs. The court struck down the quarantine
order, finding it in violation of equal protection. 96
Even though the case stands for the oft-cited proposition that
quarantines heavily reliant on racial discrimination will violate
the equal protection clause, what the court says in addition to its
headline holding is more important for this analysis. The court
concluded that the quarantine violated the clause "not only
because it was clearly applied in a discriminatory fashion, but
also because its scale was not reasonably related to the goal of
preventing plague as judged by normal medical standards,"9
with the court noting that, following the description of the
quarantine enforcement, the "danger of the spread of disease
would not diminish."9 8
Here, SVP statutes' verifiability is challenged by its trigger
distinctions. While Wisconsin can brand those found not guilty
by reason of insanity, but not those found incompetent to stand
trial, as SVPs, the state seems to be concluding that those found
not guilty by reason of insanity, as a group, are more likely to
reoffend if released than those found incompetent to stand trial.
Virginia reaches the exact opposite conclusion. But neither
conclusion is sustainable under a public health analysis because
neither conclusion is verifiable. Neither state presents data, or
any statement, as to why one group instead of the other is more
dangerous and deserving of detention. Further, the fact that the
two states exempt opposite groups from their SVP statute
indicates that the distinction cannot be defended, because at
least one of the states would undeniably be unable to
scientifically verify their results.
19 Id. at 13. On Mr. Ho's street alone, two other houses within the boundaries
were excluded from the quarantine, "although the Chinese similarly situated [were]
included." Id. at 23.
194 Id. at 13.
195 Id. at 22.
* Id. at 23-27.
197 Scott Burris, Fear Itself. AIDS, Herpes and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 487 (1985).
19 Jew Ho, 103 F. 10 at 21.
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In the quarantine context, it is easy to imagine a scenario in
which a minor distinction could defensibly serve as the basis for
commitment, even among those similarly situated in society,
because the commitment is based on scientific evidence. One can
imagine quarantining individuals who live in a particular
neighborhood, or on a particular street, because of their
proximity to those infected, while leaving their neighbors on the
next block untouched. In this scenario, this fact rationally and
verifiably distinguishes between two groups of individuals based
upon proximity to the cause of harm-erecting a defensible
border to preventive detention. The SVP regime lacks this.
D. Fairness
Systems that are neither adequately verifiable nor necessary
also fail to meet the sometimes overlapping and simple principle
of fairness. Fairness is a critical component of any ethical
quarantine:
In the midst of a pandemic, when guidance will be incomplete,
consequences uncertain, and information constantly changing,
and where hour-by-hour decisions involve life and death,
fairness is crucial. Experience shows that there is often
disagreement on what principles should be used to make fair
allocation decisions. This means that decision makers may
have also to rely on a fair process to establish the legitimacy of
priority setting decisions.'99
In addition to fair decision-making procedures, the resources
and burdens must be fairly distributed.20 0 In particular, "[plublic
health programs are objectionable when they burden a particular
segment of the population"2 01 and "should elaborate the specific
rights that people possess, set science-based standards and fair
procedures for public health measures, and require states to
actively prevent stigma and discrimination."20 2
1" Stand on Guard, supra note 147, at 16.
200 Nathan A. Bostick, et al., Ethical Obligations of Physicians Participating in
Public Health Quarantine and Isolation Measures, 123 PUB. HEALTH REP. 3, 5
(2008), available at http://www.publichealthreports.org/issueopen.cfm?articlelD=
1966 ("To ensure fairness, public health measures must be implemented in a
manner that ensures the equitable distribution of associated benefits and burdens.").
201 Id.
202 Lawrence 0. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the
World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, 291 JAMA 2623,
2626 (2004) (emphasis added), available at http://141.161.16.100/faculty/gostin/
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Fairness focuses on an intervention's target population-
which often "[creates] a class of people to which the policy
applies."2 03 Gostin argues that this can present a situation in
which the group created is either overinclusive or
underinclusive.20 4 Underinclusive policies "reach[] some but not
all persons it ought to reach," while a policy becomes
overinclusive "if it extends to more people than necessary to
achieve its purposes."205 This concept is also echoed by the court
in Jew Ho v. Williamson."* There, the quarantine did not feel
right; it overburdened San Francisco's Chinese community while
leaving others in the city unaffected.0 The SVP framework
examined here is both overinclusive and underinclusive-
creating classes of individuals subject to commitment while
wholly exempting others without reason.
The most obvious breaches of fairness in the SVP
commitment context include the trigger distinctions made by
Wisconsin and Virginia. First, in addition to being indefensible
and unverifiable from a scientific perspective, the disparate
treatment of those found incompetent to stand trial and those
found not guilty by reason of insanity seems particularly unjust:
Using the time when the break from rationality occurred
oversimplifies the calculation of an individual's future likelihood
of dangerousness. To be exposed to potentially lifelong
commitment-without scientific justification-that turns on such
a serendipitous occurrence is clearly and fundamentally unfair.
documents/InternationallnfectiousDiseases.pdf (arguing the draft revised
International Health Regulations should be structured to reflect fair public health
procedures).
203 GOSTIN, supra, note 165, at 69; see also James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism
Law and Policy: Critical Choices in Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 254, 259
(2002) ("Interventions that confine individuals must be well-targeted to
accomplishing public health objectives. Thus, interventions that are over- or
underinclusive may be constitutionally impermissible if they deprive individuals of
liberty or equal protection without justification."); Ben Horowitz, Comment, A Shot
in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to Jacobson v. Massachusetts Means for
Mandatory Vaccinations During a Public Health Emergency, 60 Am. U. L. REV. 1715,
1731 (2011) (noting that a vaccination mandate must avoid "underinclusiveness and
overinclusiveness issues").
204 GOSTIN, supra note 165, at 69.
205 Id.
20 103 F. 10, 20-21 (N.D Cal. 1900).
207 Id. at 13.
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The California distinction also fails to meet the fairness
standard. If the goal of the SVP statutes is to prevent future
sexually violent offenses by detaining those most likely to commit
those offenses in the future, then wholly excluding anyone not
currently incarcerated from the state's SVP commitment scheme
is misguided. The relatively innocuous and unimportant fact of
when the individual was convicted of his or her sexually violent
crime-those more recently convicted are much more represented
in the state's SVP regime-may have very little to do with how
dangerous the individual will be in the future.208 Fairness is not
satisfied by ease of application. Even if California can prove that
those who are currently in custody may be more dangerous than
those meeting all other criteria but who are not in custody-
perhaps because their crimes were either more recent or more
severe-the fact that so many dangerous sexual offenders are
exempt from the scheme may make its application unfair on an
individual level.
Worse, California's Supreme Court justifies this exclusion by
finding that those in prison "have yet to demonstrate their
capacity or willingness to keep their conduct within the bounds of
the law and to break old criminal habits."' But this statement
is not a reason to limit the California SVP statute to those
currently incarcerated; instead, it is the result of California's
decision to limit SVP commitment to those in jail. It is
undisputed that those who are incarcerated have not proven
themselves "willing" to keep their conduct within the bounds of
the law: how could they? The state waits to see if released
individuals-both those individuals released in the years
preceding the SVP passage and those released perhaps due to
recent well-documented overcrowding problems-have
adequately broken "old criminal habits."
The California distinction in the SVP context could be
analogized to a hypothetical quarantine situation to further
prove the point. In a scenario resembling California's SVP
triggering distinction, imagine California's public health officials
being faced with a potentially devastating pandemic of smallpox.
208 The average sentence of sex offenders in California is 45.1 months. See Jason
Peckenpaugh, Controlling Sex Offender Reentry: Jessica's Law Measures in
California 11 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/child-page/266901/doc/slspublic/JPeckenpaugh_06.pdf.
209 In re Smith, 178 P.3d 446, 483 (Cal. 2008).
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In order to address the public health concern, the state's public
health officials order the quarantine of individuals likely to
transmit smallpox-but only those who have tested positive for
smallpox who are currently hospitalized. The public health
officials would argue that those who are hospitalized and shown
to have the disease have not proven that they can safely be let
out of the hospital.
Of course, these individuals have been proven to have the
disease-and likely contracted it recently. In this regard, they
would resemble SVPs in California who have been convicted of a
sexually violent offense and are currently incarcerated. But in
the face of public safety concerns, is this fair? Should not others,
who have yet to arrive at the hospital, but who are developing
symptoms, also be scrutinized? Notice that this is true even if
those currently hospitalized can be shown to be especially
contagious. Under a PHR, the fact that the state has declared
that SVPs have created an emergency, and then responds by
wholly exempting a large number of potentially detainable
individuals from its ambit, makes California's SVP triggering
behavior look like nothing more than the state's attempt to
lengthen the prison sentences of those recently convicted.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The preceding PHR calls into question the validity of current
SVP statutes. In particular, the "trigger mechanisms" fail to
comply with public health's requirements for preventive
detention. Therefore, SVP statutes must be reworked to allow
them to function consistently with the four-part test described
above. One method would be to allow preventive detention of all
individuals who are "mentally abnormal" and who cannot control
their behavior such that they are likely to be dangerous.
Although this is theoretically satisfying and would quell the
concerns raised by this PHR, it would likely prove unpopular and
unworkable in practice because of societal fear of over-
commitment,2 10 which has also been referred to as the "Minority
Report"2 1' concern.21 This idea serves to counsel against large-
210 Interestingly, and the topic of further study, that conclusion is uncomfortable
in this context; meanwhile, quarantine-a civil detention scheme that theoretically
can apply to everyone-does not seem to evoke the same fear.
211 See MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
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scale pre-crime commitment-a concern which would be
exacerbated by universal application of SVP statutes based upon
the two remaining criteria. This concern may be best
characterized by Justice Charles K. Wiggins of the Washington
Supreme Court, in a dissent in In re Detention of Danforth-a
case in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld the SVP
commitment of Robert Danforth, a "64-year-old, mildly retarded
blind man."213
We recognize that there is a risk that Danforth might
perpetrate a sexually violent crime. But Danforth is not alone
in presenting such a risk. We cannot lock up every person who
presents a risk of future violent crime. Indeed, we recoil from
the thought of confining innocent men and women simply
because a knowledgeable objective observer is reasonably
apprehensive that man or woman will commit a crime .... We
should assist Danforth's efforts to control his urges instead of
imprisoning him.214
In addition to its controversial personal effect on a large
number of individuals, such a system would require more
resources, more attention, and more standards. If every citizen
was eligible for SVP commitment, courts would have to develop
212 See Oregon v. R.D.G., 66 P.3d 560, 569 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (Wollheim, J.,
concurring) ("In a recent movie, Minority Report, Washington, D.C. residents could
be convicted for pre-crimes they were about to commit .... As a society that values
freedom, we must avoid preventive detention and avoid imprisoning individuals for
their beliefs.") (emphasis in original); In re Detention of Danforth, 264 P.3d 783, 800
(Wash. 2011) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) ("Fortunately, we will never have PreCrime
police so long as our courts require the State to confine state action to due process of
law, requiring a present showing of dangerousness before a suspect can be civilly
committed for crimes not yet committed."); see also Suzanne L. Nelson, Note, The
Expansion of New Jersey's DNA Database Statute: The Inclusion of All Convicted
Felons, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 246 (2004) (arguing that New Jersey should
not expand its DNA database to include arrestees because "[any further expansion
will begin to implicate the 'Minority Report' scenario").
213 Danforth, 264 P.3d at 794 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Mr. Danforth had
previously been convicted of sex offenses against children, including indecent
liberties and rape. Id. at 786. Danforth made repeated attempts to get himself civilly
committed to a psychiatric facility. Id. at 794-95. After being "verbally harassed two
to three times a month" in which "people would threaten to burn his house down,"
his house "was pelted with raw eggs and someone placed a bag containing feces on
his doorstep, lit the bag on fire, knocked on his door, and ran away." Id. at 795. He
then visited the sheriffs office to try and stop the harassment, during which he told
detectives that he "feared that he was going to re-offend" and that he was "fighting
his best to not re-offend." Id. As a result, the state of Washington sought to have him
detained as an SVP.
214 Id. at 800.
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standards to determine how individuals would be committed, to
evaluate the merit of the petition, and to govern the growing
numbers of detained individuals. Given a state's limited
resources, this is not likely to be a viable solution to the concerns
presented in this review. Plus, it seems viscerally unpalatable;
states seem to be willing to go relatively far in this area but not
that far.
Nevertheless, the application of public health principles to
the SVP regime-and its inconsistent triggers-clearly
demonstrates that the framework, as currently assembled,
cannot stand untouched. As the "universal application" solution
is obviously not available, it appears that two solutions remain in
which (1) the SVP framework would be scrapped, or (2) the SVP
framework would be changed incrementally to incorporate the
concerns raised by this review. Both potential solutions are
addressed below.
A. Scrapping the Framework
First, one could apply the rationale observed in a recent
federal court case addressing the triggers under the equal
protection clause.2 15 This decision found that if the federal
government, under the Adam Walsh Act, could not rationally and
fairly apply this detention to everyone, then it should not be
allowed to apply it to anyone.2 16 On a related point, the
argument could also note that the threat provided by SVPs has
not been recognized by a majority of states, and as such, the
threat is not sufficient to support a public health detention
regime.
Under the principles raised in this analysis, this approach
provides the cleanest theoretical solution. If a detention scheme
cannot demonstrate necessity, proportionality, verifiability, and
fairness, then it should be eliminated. Surely if a quarantine
failed to take the four principles into consideration, it would be
invalidated. A SVP statute failing to meet those same standards
should meet the same fate.
215 See 7imms 1, 799 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (E.D.N.C. 2011).
21 See id.
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To make up for the potential vacuum created by eliminating
the entire SVP enterprise, states could seek to place longer
prison sentences for sexually violent offenses in its place. 217 This
would be an acceptable development; if the state were to decide
to treat this harm strictly through criminal punitive channels,
none of the civil concerns presented here would apply. It would
still allow the state to incapacitate individuals it thought were
the most dangerous among us and do it at a much lower cost
than SVP commitment. 2 18  Finally, for those diagnosed with a
mental disorder, traditional mental health civil commitment
would continue to be available as an alternative.
B. Incremental Improvement and Tiered Commitment
Besides eliminating SVP statutes, to adequately implement
changes that would address problems raised by this analysis,
states could "expand" and "contract" their SVP commitment
schemes. First, the state would expand its SVP framework so it
would apply across the current, poorly-supported discontinuous
classes of sex offenders, thereby addressing a problem currently
experienced in SVP commitment: inexplicable eligibility for some
and exclusion for other similarly-situated individuals. The
future framework would also be contracted, applying only to
those within this broader class of candidates who would be most
likely to threaten harm by ratcheting up the state's required
showing. In addition to a simultaneous expansion and
contraction, procedural protections would be tweaked to better
align the SVP framework with principles consulted in this PHR.
Specifically, in order to fill the gaps in New Jersey,
Wisconsin, Virginia, and California, SVP statutes would first
have to apply to a wider range of individuals. New Jersey would
need to apply its statute to those who have not been convicted
nor ever charged; Wisconsin would have to extend its coverage to
those found incompetent to stand trial; Virginia's statute would
be widened to apply to those acquitted by reason of insanity; and
California would have to eliminate its "current custody"
requirement.
217 This suggestion has been made recently in the context of the Adam Walsh
Act. See Ryan K. Melcher, There Ain't No End for the "Wicked": Implications of and
Recommendations for § 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act After United States v.
Comstock, 97 IOWA L. REV. 629, 661 (2012).
218 See supra text accompanying note 10.
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After eliminating the distinctions and applying the statutes
to all individuals, states could rework their statutes to place
individuals into three different groups. The group that would be
least likely to commit sexually violent acts could be made up by
those who either have (1) never been charged with, or (2) been
factually acquitted of-not including those acquitted by reason of
insanity-a sexually violent offense ("Tier 1"). Those in the
intermediate level would feature those (1) convicted of, (2) found
not guilty-by reason of insanity--of, or (3) incompetent to stand
trial for one sexually violent offense ("Tier 2"). Finally, those
most likely to be sexually dangerous could consist of those
(1) convicted of, (2) found not guilty by reason of insanity of, or
(3) incompetent to stand trial for multiple sexually violent
offenses ("Tier 3"). Tier 3 would include individuals like Gary
Minnix.219
This tiered system would differentiate individuals by levels
of risk. As a result, the resulting commitment scheme would be
fairer and more proportional in application. Under this scheme,
the state would apply comparatively more coercive detention to
those more dangerous and less coercive detention to those less
dangerous. Instead of the current result, where all individuals
meeting the standards are branded SVPs and face indefinite
detention, under this new narrowly-tailored framework,
quarantine's least restrictive alternative principle would likely be
satisfied.
For example, within this new framework, the state's level of
coercion would track the individual's risk level. Tier 1
individuals would not be automatically committed to a state
facility. Instead, non-institutional constraints, such as ankle
bracelets or intensive parole supervision, should be used. For
those in Tier 2, non-institutional constraints should be an option,
but not necessarily a presumption. Instead, individuals could be
offered limited release for strictly monitored periods; upon an
additional showing that the individual poses a low risk to the
public, these individuals could also potentially take up heavily-
monitored residence outside of the institution. Finally, for those
in Tier 3, concerns for public safety would weigh especially
heavily. Thus, Tier 3 detention may closely resemble current
SVP detention.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
894 [Vol. 87:847
20131 SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES
Once the individuals are committed as either Tier 1, 2, or 3
SVPs, the state could then tailor treatment regimens to the
applicable group. The tiers would not be static: States could
implement a system in which individuals initially committed as
Tier 3 individuals could progress to achieve Tier 2 status, with
the same movement available for those in Tier 2 seeking Tier 1
status.
Procedurally, the state could make additional changes to
achieve more verifiable and fair detention standards. First, a
state could force the fact-finder to find both criteria-mental
abnormality and lack of control making the individual
dangerous-beyond a reasonable doubt.22 0 Second, instead of an
annual commitment period, the state could apply a much shorter
review period-perhaps in three- or six-month increments. As in
the quarantine context, it is vital for the state to accurately
know-based upon accurate current conditions-who is the most
likely to be dangerous, in order to justify continued detention,
and complete this review every twelve months. This twelve-
month interval, although held constitutional in Hendricks,2 2 may
not be enough for the state to be sufficiently aware of the threat
posed by an SVP.
220 Although not a major focus of this Article, the states examined in this
analysis apply different standards before branding an individual an SVP. Wisconsin
and California require findings beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cooley v. Superior
Court, 57 P.3d 654, 663 (Cal. 2002) ("The civil commitment can only commence if,
after a trial, either a judge or a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person is an SVP."); In re Williams, 637 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001) (applying beyond a reasonable doubt standard for SVP commitment). New
Jersey and Virginia apply a clear and convincing evidence standard. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (1999) ("If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the person needs continued involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator,
it shall issue an order authorizing the involuntary commitment of the person."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(c) (2009) ("The court or jury shall determine whether, by clear
and convincing evidence, the respondent is a sexually violent predator."); VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.2-910(c) (2011) ("The burden of proof at the hearing shall be upon the
Commonwealth to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent remains a sexually violent predator."); In re Commitment of J.M.B., 964
A.2d 752, 757 (N.J. 2009) ("[T]he State must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual poses a threat to the health and safety of others if he or
she were found ... to have serious difficulty in controlling his or her harmful
behavior such that it is highly likely that the individual will not control his or her
sexually violent behavior and will reoffend." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997) (noting that the
commitment court's obligation of annual review was one of the "number
of... procedural safeguards" secured by the Kansas SVP statute).
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Finally, in addition to a jury or judge making a finding that
the individual should be committed-or recommitted-as an
SVP, a panel of three anonymous mental health professionals
could also serve as decision-makers. Under this scheme, SVP
commitment-under any of the three tiers-would only result
with both the court's positive verdict and the positive decision of
a majority of the panel of mental health professionals. As seen in
the quarantine context, medical personnel-public health
officials, physicians, and ethicists-make decisions governing the
parameters of state intervention. Likewise, in this health-based
preventive commitment scheme, the state should allow the
professionals to decide as well, rather than judges or juries alone.
Besides further injecting verifiability into the scheme, this
change seeks to change the current incentive that exists for
courts to recommit individuals even when they may not be the
most deserving of it.222
CONCLUSION
Now more than a decade and a half after Kansas v.
Hendricks, the SVP framework is still laden with disparate
entrance criteria that inhibit and prevent the full goals of SVP
statutes from being realized. These distinctions open the doors
to a PHR based upon ethics and principles borrowed from
quarantine-focused on necessity, proportionality, verifiability,
and fairness. To be sure, both SVP commitment and involuntary
quarantine seek to address public health and safety
"emergencies" by allowing for the detention of society's most
dangerous individuals in an effort to prevent harm. Given the
similarities between the two schemes, an application of public
health principles to SVP statutes would be expected to prove
unremarkable.
But after performing this analysis, contrary to Justice
Thomas' suggestion in Kansas v. Hendricks, the SVP statutes'
limiting criteria do not survive a PHR; they do not conform to
ethical and policy standards that govern and guide quarantine
implementation. This conclusion forces states to choose between
one of two courses of action. Either state legislatures should
eliminate the statutes entirely or should push for incremental
changes that would ensure that individuals affected by SVP
222 See Winick, supra note 70, at 543-44.
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detention are governed by a scheme that meets public health
standards. Unfortunately, however, as it currently stands, the
SVP framework is nothing more than an unprincipled indefinite
quarantine for the so-called dangerous.
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